This study analyzes the planning which occurred and the provisions of the major personnel procurement programs which were established to recruit and retain physicians in the All-Volunteer Army. The investigation is focused on an evaluation of the effectiveness of these procurement programs during the period 1973-1978 and an analysis of the reasons for program performance during the period studied. An assessment of the ability of the All-Volunteer Army to attract and retain sufficient physicians to accomplish its mission is offered. Primary research methodology consists of an extensive review of Congressional testimony concerning the thesis topic during the period 1972 through 1978, and a comparison of this testimony over a period of time. A review of pertinent military and civilian literature is provided. The research reveals that during its first five years of existence, the all-volunteer force experiment has had a seriously negative impact on Army medical officer procurement. Fundamental flaws in military physician procurement and retention programs, compounded by inconsistent as well as poorly-timed efforts to remedy them have significantly hindered optimum program effectiveness. In the zero-draft environment, the Army Medical Department has not been able to attract or retain sufficient medical officers in the active and reserve components to maintain the readiness posture required by its primary mission to support combat operations or to provide the health care expected by its eligible beneficiaries. The investigation concludes that major adjustments must be made to existing physician procurement programs in order to enable achievement of adequate and self-sustaining force of medical officers in the 1980's. Specific recommendations are offered.