The growing strategic demand for joint capability, and the expectation of less defense spending to acquire this capability, leads many to say that we need more joint acquisition programs. However, the 'joint acquisition' process is not always the most efficient way in which to develop and procure these capabilities. Historically, we have not fully realized the expected benefits from our joint acquisition programs. In fact, we have seen joint programs with troubled schedules and performance. While there have been some successful joint acquisition programs, many face several pitfalls not common to single service acquisition efforts. This paper looks at the history of jointness and joint programs within the acquisition community, some of the pitfalls of joint programs and also provides examples of joint programs that have struggled with these pitfalls. It argues the case that the single service acquisition process can provide capabilities that are interoperable within a joint environment. Ultimately, if we are going to continue forcing the use of the joint acquisition process, the paper provides some recommended changes that will set the conditions early for success and provide greater probability that we can gain the projected benefits of joint acquisition programs.