The prosecution of war has always been tempered by constraints, both real and artificial. These constraints are described by Clausewitz as the factors which prevent the conduct of absolute war. These factors include moral and professional codes of conduct many of which have been codified through the Geneva and Hague Conventions, International Humanitarian Law, military doctrine and others to establish expectations for behavior. It is the adherence to these norms or expectations that allow belligerents to argue the legitimacy of their actions and to maintain international and domestic popular support. Among these expectations is the treatment of civilians and noncombatants. Attacks against the civilian population have been a part of warfare since its inception, from siegecraft in antiquity through strategic bombing to the modern concept of information warfare, the civilian populace has paid a heavy price for it's defense. Today the classification and legitimate targeting of civilians and noncombatants through the use of lethal and non-lethal fires is critical for any military operation, which has as it's operational or strategic objectives/aims the separation of civilian leadership or the military from the popular (civilian) support of the people. It is also critical in a time when the destruction of key military infrastructure (fuel, power generation, communications) has first, second and third order effects that ripple through the civilian populace. Finally, this classification, targeting and the impact of collateral damage is critical in a period when technology creates expectations which when failed to be met, threaten international legitimacy and often popular support within fragile coalitions. This monograph concludes that just as a distinction is made between the justness of war (jus ad bellum) with justness in war (jus in bello) to differentiate between the responsibilities of belligerents in resorting to war with their responsibilities in the prosecution of