This work will argue that the operational intelligence (OpIntel) culture in the U.S. Navy now was codified in the Cold War. The work will also make the case that this existing OpIntel culture is rooted in aircraft carrier culture, a culture which accepts adaptation and favors a structure that has the principles of mission command built in. Additionally, I see this work as having two purposes: 1) making the case that the USN's OpIntel strengths now in an age of Great Power competition are the same as those which guided the USN during the Cold War, and 2) Making the case for the success of USN OpIntel (or viewed another cynical way, that because we are in an era of Great Power competition, that the old methods of OpIntel at sea work, so why change them?) One other argument outside the central argument is that USN OpIntel owes its success to carrier culture specifically, so there is an aviation culture angle here. One other point the author raises in his proposal is that this evolution of OpIntel at sea in the face of the Soviet threat fostered a culture of trust between USN commanding officers and their intel officers.